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Abstract. Auto-active verifiers provide a level of automation intermediate be-
tween fully automatic and interactive: users supply code with annotations as in-
put while benefiting from a high level of automation in the back-end. This paper
presents AutoProof, a state-of-the-art auto-active verifier for object-oriented se-
quential programs with complex functional specifications. AutoProof fully sup-
ports advanced object-oriented features and a powerful methodology for framing
and class invariants, which make it applicable in practice to idiomatic object-
oriented patterns. The paper focuses on describing AutoProof’s interface, de-
sign, and implementation features, and demonstrates AutoProof’s performance
on a rich collection of benchmark problems. The results attest AutoProof’s com-
petitiveness among tools in its league on cutting-edge functional verification of
object-oriented programs.
1 Auto-active Functional Verification of Object-oriented Programs
Program verification techniques differ wildly in their degree of automation and, cor-
respondingly, in the kinds of properties they target. One class of approaches—which
includes techniques such as abstract interpretation and model checking—is fully au-
tomatic or “push button”, the only required input being a program to be verified; to
achieve complete automation, these approaches tend to be limited to verifying simple
or implicit properties such as absence of invalid pointer dereference. At the other end
of the spectrum are interactive approaches to verification—which include tools such as
KeY [3]—where the user is ultimately responsible for providing input to the prover on
demand, whenever it needs guidance through a successful correctness proof; in princi-
ple, this makes it possible to verify arbitrarily complex properties, but it is approachable
only by highly-trained verification experts.
In more recent years a new class of approaches have emerged that try to achieve
an intermediate degree of automation in the continuum that goes from automatic to
interactive—hence their designation [23] as the portmanteau auto-active1. Auto-active
tools need no user input during verification, which proceeds autonomously until it suc-
ceeds or fails; however, the user is still expected to provide guidance indirectly through
annotations (such as loop invariants) in the input program. The auto-active approach has
the potential to better support incrementality: proving simple properties would require
little annotations and of the simple kinds that novice users may be able to provide;
1 Although inter-matic would be as good a name.
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proving complex properties would still be possible by sustaining a heavy annotation
burden.
This paper describes AutoProof, an auto-active verifier for functional properties of
(sequential) object-oriented programs. In its latest development state, AutoProof offers
a unique combination of features that make it a powerful tool in its category and a
significant contribution to the state of the art. AutoProof targets a real complex object-
oriented programming language (Eiffel)—as opposed to more abstract languages de-
signed specifically for verification. It supports most language constructs, as well as a
full-fledged verification methodology for heap-manipulating programs based on a flex-
ible annotation protocol, sufficient to completely verify a variety of programs that are
representative of object-oriented idioms as used in practice. AutoProof was developed
with extensibility in mind: its annotation library can be augmented with new abstract
models, and its implementation can accommodate changes in the input language. While
Eiffel has a much smaller user base than other object-oriented languages such as C++,
Java, and C#, the principles behind AutoProof are largely language independent; hence,
they are relevant to a potentially large number of researchers and users—for whom this
paper is written.
The verification challenges we use to evaluate AutoProof (Sect. 5) are emerging as
the gold standard [18] to demonstrate the capabilities of program provers for functional
correctness which, unlike fully automatic tools, use different formats and conventions
for input annotations and support specifications of disparate expressiveness, and hence
cannot directly be compared on standard benchmark implementations.
Previous work of ours, summarized in Sect. 2.2, described the individual techniques
available in AutoProof. This paper focuses on presenting AutoProof’s functionalities
(Sect. 3), on describing significant aspects of its design and implementation (Sect. 4),
and on outlining the results of experiments with realistic case studies, with the goal
of showing that AutoProof’s features and performance demonstrate its competitiveness
among other tools in its league—auto-active verifiers for object-oriented programs.
AutoProof is available as part of the open-source Eiffel Verification Environment
(EVE) as well as online in your browser; the page
http://se.inf.ethz.ch/research/autoproof/
contains source and binary distributions, detailed usage instructions, a user manual, an
interactive tutorial, and the benchmarks solutions discussed in Sect. 5.
2 Related Work
2.1 Program Verifiers
In reviewing related work, we focus on the tools that are closer to AutoProof in terms
of features, and design principles and goals. Only few of them are, like AutoProof,
auto-active, work on real object-oriented programming languages, and support the ver-
ification of general functional properties. Krakatoa [10] belongs to this category, as
it works on Java programs annotated with a variant of JML (the Java Modeling Lan-
guage [19]). Since it lacks a full-fledged methodology for class invariants and framing,
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using Krakatoa to verify object-oriented idiomatic patterns—such as those we discuss
in Sect. 5.1—would be quite impractical; in fact, the reference examples distributed
with Krakatoa target the verification of algorithmic problems where object-oriented
features are immaterial. Similar observations apply to the few other auto-active tools
working on Java and JML, such as ESC/Java2 [5] or the more recent OpenJML [26,7].
Even when ESC/Java2 was used on industrial-strength case studies (such as the KOA
e-voting system [17]), the emphasis was on modeling and correct-by-construction de-
velopment, and verification was normally applied only to limited parts of the systems.
By contrast, the Spec# system [1] was the forerunner in a new research direction, also
followed by AutoProof, that focuses on the complex problems raised by object-oriented
structures with sharing, object hierarchies, and collaborative patterns. Spec# works on
an annotation-based dialect of the C# language and supports an ownership model which
is suitable for hierarchical object structures, as well as visibility-based invariants to
specify more complex object relations. Collaborative object structures as implemented
in practice (Sect. 5.1) require, however, more flexible methodologies [28] not currently
available in Spec#. Tools, such as VeriFast [16], based on separation logic provide pow-
erful methodologies through abstractions different than class invariants, which may lead
to a lower level of automation than tools such as AutoProof and a generally higher an-
notation overhead—ultimately targeting highly trained users.
The experience with the Spec# project suggested that targeting a real object-oriented
programming language introduces numerous complications and may divert the focus
away from fundamental problems in tool-supported verification. The Dafny program
verifier [22] was developed based on this lesson: it supports a simple language ex-
pressly designed for verification, which eschews most complications of real object-
oriented programming languages (such as inheritance and a complex memory model).
Other auto-active verifiers target programming language paradigms other than object
orientation. Leon [31] and Why3 [11], for example, work on functional programming
languages—respectively, a subset of Scala and a dialect of ML; VCC [6] works on C
programs and supports object invariants but with an emphasis on memory safety of
low-level concurrent code.
AutoProof lies between automatic and interactive tools in the wide spectrum of
verification tools. The CodeContract checker (formerly known as Clousot [25]) is a
powerful static analyzer for .NET languages that belongs to the former category (and
hence it is limited to properties expressible in its abstract domains). The KeY system [3]
for Java belongs to the latter category: while it supports SMT solvers as back-ends
to automatically discharge some verification conditions, its full-fledged usage requires
explicit user interactions to guide the prover through the verification process.
2.2 Our Previous Work on AutoProof
In previous work, we formalized some critical object-oriented features as they are avail-
able in Eiffel, notably function objects (called “agents” in Eiffel) and inheritance and
polymorphism [34]. An important aspects for usability is reducing annotation over-
head; to this end, we introduced heuristics known as “two-step verification” [35] and
demonstrated them on algorithmic challenges [32]. We recently presented the theory
behind AutoProof’s invariant methodology [28], which includes full support for class
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invariants, framing, and ghost code. The current paper discusses how these features
are available in AutoProof, with a focus on advanced object-oriented verification chal-
lenges.
3 Using AutoProof
AutoProof is a static verifier for Eiffel programs which interacts with users according
to the auto-active paradigm [23]: verification attempts are completely automated (“push
button”), but users are expected in general to provide additional information in the form
of annotations (loop invariants, intermediate assertions, etc.) for verification to succeed.
AutoProof targets the verification of functional correctness. Given a collection of
Eiffel classes, it tries to establish that: routines satisfy their pre/post and frame speci-
fications and maintain class invariants; routine calls take place in states satisfying the
callee’s precondition; loops and recursive calls terminate; integer variables do not over-
flow; there are no dereferences of Void (null) objects.
AutoProof’s techniques are sound2: successful verification entails that the input
program is correct with respect to its given specification. Since it deals with expres-
sive specifications, AutoProof is necessarily incomplete: failed verification may indi-
cate functional errors but also shortcomings of the heuristics of the underlying theorem
prover (which uses such heuristics to reason in practice about highly-complex and un-
decidable logic fragments).
Dealing with inconclusive error reports in incomplete tools is a practical hurdle
to usability that can spoil user experience—especially for novices. To improve user
feedback in case of failed verification attempts, AutoProof implements a collection of
heuristics known as “two-step verification” [35]. When they are enabled, each failed
verification attempt is transparently followed by a second step that is in general unsound
(as it uses under-approximations such as loop unrolling) but helps discern whether
failed verification is due to real errors or just to insufficiently detailed annotations. Users
see the combined output from the two steps in the form of suggestions to improve the
program and its annotations. For example, if verification of a loop fails in the first step
but succeeds with finite loop unrolling, the suggestion is that there are no obvious errors
in the loop but the loop invariant should be strengthened to make it inductive.
3.1 User Interface (UI)
AutoProof offers its core functionalities both through a command line interface (CLI)
and a library (API). End users normally interact with AutoProof through one of two
graphical interfaces (GUI): a web-based GUI is available at http://cloudstudio.
ethz.ch/comcom/#AutoProof; and AutoProof is fully integrated in EVE, the open-
source research branch of the EiffelStudio development environment. The following
presentation focuses on AutoProof in EVE, but most features are available in every UI.
Users launch AutoProof on the current project, or on specific classes or members
thereof. Verification proceeds in the background until it terminates, is stopped, or times
2 As usual, modulo bugs in the implementation.
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Fig. 1: The AutoProof output panel showing verification results in EVE.
out. Results are displayed in a panel such as in Fig. 1: each entry corresponds to a rou-
tine of some class and is colored to summarize verification outcome. Green entries are
successfully verified; red entries have failed verification; and yellow entries denote in-
valid input, which cannot be translated and verified (for example, impure functions with
side effects used as specification elements determine invalid input). Red entries can be
expanded into more detailed error messages or suggestions to fix them (when enabled,
two-step verification helps provide more precise suggestions). For example, the failed
verification entry for a routine may detail that its loop invariant may not be maintained,
or that it may not terminate; and suggest that the loop invariant be strengthened, or a
suitable variant be provided.
AutoProof’s UI is deliberately kept simple with few options and sensible defaults.
For advanced users, fine-grained control over AutoProof’s behavior is still possible
through program annotations, which we outline in the next section.
3.2 Input Language Support
AutoProof supports most of the Eiffel language as used in practice, obviously including
Eiffel’s native notation for contracts (specification elements) such as pre- and post-
conditions, class invariants, loop invariants and variants, and inlined assertions such as
check (assert in other languages). Object-oriented features—classes and types, mul-
tiple inheritance, polymorphism—are fully supported [34], and so are imperative and
procedural constructs.
Partially supported and unsupported features. A few language features that Au-
toProof does not currently fully support have a semantics that violates well-formedness
conditions required for verification: AutoProof doesn’t support specification expres-
sions with side effects (for example, a precondition that creates an object). It also
doesn’t support the semantics of once routines (similar to static in Java and C#),
which would require global reasoning thus breaking modularity.
Other partially supported features originate in the distinction between machine and
mathematical representation of types. Among primitive types, machine INTEGERs are
fully supported (including overflows); floating-point REALs are modeled as infinite-
precision mathematical reals; strings are not supported but for single-character oper-
ations. Array and list library containers with simplified interfaces are supported out
of the box. Other container types require custom specification; we recently developed a
fully verified full-fledged data structure library including sets, hash tables, and trees [9].
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Agents (function objects) are partially supported, with some restrictions in their specifi-
cations [34]. The semantics of native external routines is reduced to their specification.
We designed [34] a translation for exceptions based on the latest draft of the Eiffel lan-
guage standard, but AutoProof doesn’t support it yet since the Eiffel compiler still only
implements the obsolete syntax for exceptions (and exceptions have very limited usage
in Eiffel anyway).
Annotations for verification. Supporting effective auto-active verification requires
much more than translating the input language and specification into verification condi-
tions. AutoProof supports semantic collaboration, a full-fledged framing methodology
we designed to reason about class invariants of structures made of collaborating objects,
integrated with a standard ownership model; both are described in detail in our previous
work [28]. AutoProof’s verification methodology relies on annotations that are not part
of the Eiffel language. Annotations in assertions or other specification elements use pre-
defined dummy features with empty implementation. Annotations of this kind include
modify and read clauses (specifying objects whose state may be modified or read by a
routine’s body). For instance, a clause modify (set) in a routine’s precondition denotes
that executing the routine may modify objects in set.
Annotations that apply to whole classes or features are expressed by means of
Eiffel’s note clauses, which attach additional information that is ignored by the Eif-
fel compiler but is processed by AutoProof. Annotations of this kind include defining
class members as ghost (only used in specifications), procedures as lemmas (outlining
a proof using assertions and ghost-state manipulation), and which members of a class
define its abstract model (to be referred to in interface specifications). For example
note status: ghost tags as ghost the member it is attached to.
A distinctive trait of semantic collaboration, as available to AutoProof users, is the
combination of flexible expressive annotations with useful defaults. Flexible annota-
tions offer fine-grained control over the visibility of specification elements (for ex-
ample, invariant clauses can be referenced individually); defaults reduce the amount
of required manual annotations in many practical cases. The combination of the two
is instrumental in making AutoProof usable on complex examples of realistic object-
oriented programs.
Verifier’s options. AutoProof verification options are also expressed by means of
note clauses: users can disable generating boilerplate implicit contracts, skip verifica-
tion of a specific class, disable termination checking (only verify partial correctness),
and define a custom mapping of a class’s type to a Boogie theory file. See AutoProof’s
manual for a complete list of features, options, and examples of usage.
Specification library. To support writing complex specifications, AutoProof pro-
vides a library—called MML for Mathematical Model Library—of pre-defined ab-
stract types . These includes mathematical structures such as sets, relations, sequences,
bags (multisets), and maps. The MML annotation style follows the model-based para-
digm [27], which helps write abstract and concise, yet expressive, specifications. MML’s
features are fully integrated in AutoProof by means of effective mappings to Boogie
background theories. A distinctive advantage of providing mathematical types as an
annotated library is that MML is extensible: users can easily provide additional abstrac-
tions by writing annotated Eiffel classes and by linking them to background theories
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using custom note annotations—in the very same way existing MML classes are de-
fined. This is not possible in most other auto-active verifiers, where mathematical types
for specification are built into the language syntax.
binary_search (a: ARRAY [INTEGER]; value: INTEGER): INTEGER
require sorted: is_sorted (a.sequence)
local low, up, middle: INTEGER
do
from low := 1; up := a.count + 1
invariant
low_and_up_range: 1≤ low and low≤ up and up≤ a.count + 1
result_range: Result= 0 or 1≤ Result and Result≤ a.count
not_left: across 1 |..| (low−1) as i all a.sequence[i] <value end
not_right: across up |..| a.count as i all value<a.sequence[i] end
found: Result>0 implies a.sequence[Result] = value
until low≥ up or Result>0
loop
middle := low + ((up− low) // 2)
if a[middle] <value then low := middle + 1
elseif a[middle] >value then up := middle
else Result := middle end
variant (a.count− Result) + (up− low) end
ensure
present: a.sequence.has (value) = (Result>0)
not_present: not a.sequence.has (value) = (Result= 0)
found_if_present: Result>0 implies a.sequence[Result] = value
end
Fig. 2: Binary search implementation verified by AutoProof.
Input language syntax. Fig. 2 shows an example of annotated input: an implemen-
tation of binary search (problem BINS in Tab. 1) that AutoProof can verify. From top to
bottom, the routine binary_search includes signature, precondition (require), local
variable declarations, body consisting of an initialization (from) followed by a loop that
executes until its exit condition becomes true, and postcondition (ensure). The loop’s
annotations include loop invariant and variant. Each specification element consists
of clauses, one per line, with a tag (such as sorted for the lone precondition clause)
for identification in error reports. Quantified expressions in contracts use the across
syntax, which corresponds to (bounded) first-order universal (across ... all) and ex-
istential (across ... some) quantification. For example, loop invariant clause not_left
corresponds to ∀i : 1 ≤ i < low =⇒ a.sequence[i] < value.
4 How AutoProof Works: Architecture and Implementation
As it is customary in deductive verification, AutoProof translates input programs into
verification conditions (VCs): logic formulas whose validity entails correctness of the
input programs. Following the approach pioneered by Spec# [1] and since adopted by
numerous other tools, AutoProof does not generate VCs directly but translates Eiffel
programs into Boogie programs [21] and calls the Boogie tool to generate VCs from
the latter. Boogie is a simple procedural language tailored for verification, as well as
a verification tool that takes programs written in the Boogie language, generates VCs
for them, feeds the VCs to an SMT solver (Z3 by default), and interprets the solver’s
output in terms of elements of the input Boogie program. Using Boogie decouples VC
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generation from processing the source language (Eiffel, in AutoProof’s case) and takes
advantage of Boogie’s efficient VC generation capabilities.
annotated
Eiffel program
Boogie-like
AST
Boogie
program
Verification
Conditions
Boogie SMTsolver
Fig. 3: Workflow of AutoProof with Boogie back-end.
As outlined in Fig. 3, AutoProof implements the translation from Eiffel to Boogie
in two stages. In the first stage, it processes an input Eiffel program and translates it into
a Boogie-like abstract syntax tree (AST); in the second stage, AutoProof transcribes the
AST into a textual Boogie program.
The rest of this section outlines the overall mapping from Eiffel to Boogie (Sect. 4.1),
and then focuses on describing how AutoProof’s architecture (Sect. 4.2) and implemen-
tation features (Sect. 4.3) make for a flexible and customizable translation process. We
focus on discussing the challenges tackled when developing AutoProof and the advan-
tages of our implemented solutions.
4.1 Eiffel to Boogie Encoding
We briefly recall the core features of how Eiffel is encoded in Boogie; see our previous
work [34] for details. Boogie is a simple procedural language without explicit support
for object-oriented features or any form of dynamic memory. Therefore, a key feature
of the encoding is a memory model mapping Eiffel’s heap, references, and objects. The
Heap is a Boogie global variable
var Heap : 〈α〉 [ref, Field α] α
which maps pairs of reference (type ref) and field name (type Field) into values.
The heap type is polymorphic with respect to the value type α, which can be any of
the available types—including references ref and Boogie primitive types such as int
and bool. In the encoding, Eiffel reference types become ref in Boogie, whereas Eiffel
primitive types become Boogie primitive types with axiomatic constraints to ensure
consistent representation. For example, Eiffel variables of type INTEGER map to Boogie
variables of type int; the latter, however, corresponds to mathematical integers whereas
the former has 32-bit precision. To bridge the semantic gap, functions such as
function is_integer(i : int) : (bool) { −231 ≤ i ≤ 231 − 1 }
are used in the Boogie encoding to check for absence of overflows in operations that
manipulate Eiffel integers.
An Eiffel class declaration class C inherit B feature a: A end introduces a class
C, inheriting from another class B, that includes an attribute a of type A. The Boogie en-
coding of C comprises an uninterpreted type identifier const unique C: Type related,
in an axiom, to B’s type identifier by the “subtype of” partial order relation C < : B. The
axioms about classes are built around this relation so as to support polymorphism.
C’s attribute a determines a field name const C.a: Field ref, which is used to
access the object attached to a in the heap. For example, the Eiffel assignment c.a := x
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(where c is a reference of class C and a is one of C’s attributes) is expressed in Boogie
as Heap := Heap[c, C.a := x]: update to x the mapping of the pair (c, C.a) in global
variable Heap, while leaving the rest of the mapping unchanged.
Eiffel routines translate to Boogie procedures: Eiffel procedures (not returning any
value) update the heap according to their modify clauses; Eiffel functions are assumed
pure by default, in which case an Eiffel function f of class C translates to both a Boogie
procedure C.f and a Boogie function fun.C.f. The former’s postcondition includes
a check that C.f returns values consistent with fun.C.f’s definition. Then, C.f is used
to check f’s correctness against its specification and to reason about usages of f in im-
perative code; fun.C.f encodes f’s values when they’re used in specification elements.
The translation of control-flow structures (conditionals and loops) uses the corre-
sponding Boogie structures whenever possible. The encoding of advanced verification
features such as semantic collaboration and two-step verification is described in related
work [34,28,35] (see also Sect. 3.2).
4.2 Extensible Architecture
Top-level API. Class AUTOPROOF is the main entry point of AutoProof’s API. It offers
features to submit Eiffel code, and to start and stop the verification process. Objects
of class RESULT store the outcome of a verification session, which can be queried by
calling routines of the class. One can also register an Eiffel agent (function object) with
an AUTOPROOF object; the outcome RESULT object is passed to the agent for processing
as soon as it is available. This pattern is customary in reactive applications such as
AutoProof’s GUI in EVE.
Translation to Boogie. An abstract syntax tree (AST) expresses the same semantics
as Eiffel source code but using elements reflecting Boogie’s constructs. Type relations
such as inheritance are explicitly represented (based on type checking) using axiomatic
constraints, so that ASTs contain all the information necessary for verification. The
transcription of the AST into a concrete Boogie program is implemented by a visi-
tor [14] of the AST. Modifying AutoProof in response to changes in Boogie’s syntax
would only require to modify the visitor.
Extension points. AutoProof’s architecture incorporates extension points where it
is possible to programmatically modify and extend AutoProof’s behavior to implement
different verification processes. Each extension point maintains a number of handlers
that take care of aspects of the translation from Eiffel to the Boogie-like AST. Mul-
tiple handlers are composed according to the chain of responsibility pattern [14]; this
means that a handler may only implement the translation of one specific source lan-
guage element, while delegating to the default AutoProof handlers in all other cases. A
new translation feature can thus be added by writing a handler and registering it at an
extension point. Extension points target three program elements of different generality.
Across extension points handle the translation of Eiffel across expressions, which cor-
respond to quantified expressions. Handlers can define a semantics of quantification
over arbitrary data structures and domains. (AutoProof uses this extension point to
translate quantifications over arrays and lists.)
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Call extension points handle the translation of Eiffel calls, both in executable code
and specifications. Handlers can define translations specific to certain data types.
(AutoProof uses this extension point to translate functions on integers and dummy
features for specification.)
Expression extension points handle the translation of expressions. Handlers can define
translations of practically every Eiffel expression into a Boogie-like AST represen-
tation. This extension point subsumes the other two, which offer a simpler interface
sufficient when only specific language elements require a different translation.
The flexibility provided for by extension points is particular to AutoProof: the architec-
ture of other similar tools (Spec#, Dafny, and OpenJML) does not seem to offer compa-
rable architectural features for straightforward extensibility in the object-oriented style.
4.3 Implementation Features
AutoProof’s implementation consists of about 25’000 lines of Eiffel code in 160 classes.
Modular translation. AutoProof performs modular reasoning: the effects of a call
to p within routine r’s body are limited to what is declared in p’s specification (its pre-
and postcondition and frame) irrespective of p’s body (which is only used to verify p’s
correctness). To achieve modularity incrementally, AutoProof maintains a translation
pool of references to Eiffel elements (essentially, routines and their specifications). Ini-
tially, it populates the pool with references to the routines of the classes specified as
input to be verified. Then, it proceeds as follows: (1) select an element el from the pool
that hasn’t been translated yet; (2) translate el into Boogie-like AST and mark el as
translated; (3) if el refers to (i.e., calls) any element p not in the pool, add a reference
to p’s specification to the pool; (4) if all elements in the pool are marked as translated
stop, otherwise repeat (1). This process populates the pool with the transitive closure
of the “calls” relation, whose second elements in relationship pairs are specifications,
starting from the input elements to be verified.
Traceability of results. The auto-active paradigm is based on interacting with users
at the high level of the source language; in case of failed verification, reports must refer
to the input Eiffel program rather than to the lower level (Boogie code). To this end, Au-
toProof follows the standard approach of adding structured comments to various parts
of the Boogie code—most importantly to every assertion that undergoes verification:
postconditions; preconditions of called routine at call sites; loop invariants; and other
intermediate asserts. Comments may include information about the type of condition
that is checked (postcondition, loop termination, etc.), the tag identifying the clause (in
Eiffel, users can name each assertion clause for identification), a line number in the
Eiffel program, the called routine’s name (at call sites), and whether an assertion was
generated by applying a default schema that users have the option to disable (such as
in the case of default class invariant annotations [28]). For each assertion that fails ver-
ification, AutoProof reads the information in the corresponding comment and makes it
available in a RESULT object to the agents registered through the API to receive veri-
fication outcomes about some or all input elements. RESULT objects also include infor-
mation about verification times. This publish/subscribe scheme provides fine-grained
control on how results are displayed.
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Bulk vs. forked feedback. AutoProof provides feedback to users in one of two
modes. In bulk mode all input is translated into a single Boogie file; results are fed
back to users when verification of the whole input has completed. Using AutoProof in
bulk mode minimizes translation and Boogie invocation overhead but provides feed-
back synchronously, only when the whole batch has been processed. In contrast, Au-
toProof’s forked mode offers asynchronous feedback: each input routine (and implicit
proof obligations such as for class invariant admissibility checking) is translated into
its own self-contained Boogie file; parallel instances of Boogie run on each file and
results are fed back to users asynchronously as soon as any Boogie process terminates.
AutoProof’s UIs use the simpler bulk mode by default, but offer an option to switch to
the forked mode when responsiveness and a fast turnaround are deemed important.
5 Benchmarks and Evaluation
We give capsule descriptions of benchmark problems that we verified using the latest
version of AutoProof; the complete solutions are available at http://se.inf.ethz.
ch/research/autoproof/repo through AutoProof’s web interface.
5.1 Benchmarks Description
Our selection of problems is largely based on the verification challenges put forward
during several scientific forums, namely the SAVCBS workshops [29], and various ver-
ification competitions [18,4,12,15] and benchmarks [36]. These challenges have re-
cently emerged as the customary yardstick against which to measure progress and open
challenges in verification of full functional correctness.
Tab. 1 presents a short description of verified problems. For complete descriptions
see the references (and [28] for our solutions to problems 11–17). The table is parti-
tioned in three groups: the first group (1–10) includes mainly algorithmic problems; the
second group (11–17) includes object-oriented design challenges that require complex
invariant and framing methodologies; the third group (18–27) targets data-structure re-
lated problems that combine algorithmic and invariant-based reasoning. The second and
third group include cutting-edge challenges of reasoning about functional properties of
objects in the heap; for example, PIP describes a data structure whose node invariants
depend on objects not accessible in the physical heap.
5.2 Verified Solutions with AutoProof
Tab. 2 displays data about the verified solutions to the problems of Sect. 5.1; for each
problem: the number of Eiffel classes (#C) and routines (#R), the latter split into ghost
functions and lemma procedures and concrete (non-ghost) routines; the lines of exe-
cutable Eiffel CODE and of Eiffel SPECIFICATION (a total of T specification lines, split
into preconditions P , postconditions Q, frame specifications F , loop invariants L and
variants V , auxiliary annotations including ghost code A, and class invariants C); the
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# NAME DESCRIPTION FROM
1 Arithmetic (ARITH) Build arithmetic operations based on the increment operation. [36]
2 Binary search (BINS) Binary search on a sorted array (iterative and recursive version). [36]
3 Sum & max (S&M) Sum and maximum of an integer array. [18]
4 Search a list (SEARCH) Find the index of the first zero element in a linked list of integers. [18]
5 Two-way max (2-MAX) Find the maximum element in an array by searching at both ends. [4]
6 Two-way sort (2-SORT) Sort a Boolean array in linear time using swaps at both ends. [12]
7 Dutch flag (DUTCH) Partition an array in three different regions (specific and general verions). [8]
8 LCP (LCP) Longest common prefix starting at given positions x and y in an array. [15]
9 Rotation (ROT) Circularly shift a list by k positions (multiple algorithms). [13]
10 Sorting (SORT) Sorting of integer arrays (multiple algorithms).
11 Iterator (ITER) Multiple iterators over a collection are invalidated when the content changes. [29, ’06]
12 Subject/observer (S/O) Design pattern: multiple observers cache the content of a subject object. [29, ’07]
13 Composite (CMP) Design pattern: a tree with consistency between parent and children nodes. [29, ’08]
14 Master clock (MC) A number of slave clocks are loosely synchronized to a master. [2]
15 Marriage (MAR) Person and spouse objects with co-dependent invariants. [24]
16 Doubly-linked list (DLL) Linked list whose nodes have links to left and right neighbors. [24]
17 PIP (PIP) Graph structure with cycles where each node links to at most one parent. [30]
18 Closures (CLOSE) Various applications of function objects. [20]
19 Strategy (STRAT) Design pattern: a program’s behavior is selected at runtime. [20]
20 Command (CMD) Design pattern: encapsulate complete information to execute a command. [20]
21 Map ADT (MAP) Generic map ADT with layered data. [36]
22 Linked queue (QUEUE) Queue implemented using a linked list. [36]
23 Tree maximum (TMAX) Find the maximum value in nodes of a binary tree. [4]
24 Ring buffer (BUFF) A bounded queue implemented using a circular array. [12]
25 Hash set (HSET) A hash set with mutable elements.
26 Board game 1 (GAME1) A simple board game application: players throw dice and move on a board.
27 Board game 2 (GAME2) A more complex board game application: different board-square types.
Table 1: Descriptions of benchmark problems.
S/C specification to code ratio (measured in tokens)3; the lines of BOOGIE input (where
tr is the problem-specific translation code and bg are the included background theory
necessary for verification); the overall verification time (in bulk mode). AutoProof ran
on a single core of a Windows 7 machine with a 3.5 GHz Intel i7-core CPU and 16 GB
of memory, using Boogie v. 2.2.30705.1126 and Z3 v. 4.3.2 as backends.
Given that we target full functional verification, our specification to code ratios
are small to moderate, which demonstrates that AutoProof’s notation and methodology
support concise and effective annotations for verification. Verification times also tend
to be moderate, which demonstrates that AutoProof’s translation to Boogie is effective.
To get an idea of the kinds of annotations required, and of their level of abstraction,
we computed the ratio A/T of auxiliary to total annotations. On average, 2.8 out of
10 lines of specification are auxiliary annotations; the distribution is quite symmetric
around its mean; auxiliary annotations are less than 58% of the specification lines in all
problems. Auxiliary annotations tend to be lower level, since they outline intermediate
proof goals which are somewhat specific to the way in which the proof is carried out.
Thus, the observed range of A/T ratios seems to confirm how AutoProof supports
incrementality: complex proofs are possible but require more, lower level annotations.
5.3 Open Challenges
The collection of benchmark problems discussed in the previous sections shows, by and
large, that AutoProof is a state-of-the-art auto-active tool for the functional verifica-
3 In accordance with common practices in verification competitions, we count tokens for the S/C
ratio; but we provide other measures in lines, which are more naturally understandable.
12
# NAME #C #R CODE SPECIFICATION S/C BOOGIE TIME [s]
co gh T P Q F L V A C tr bg
1 ARITH 1 6 0 99 44 11 12 0 12 9 0 0 0.4 927 579 3.1
2 BINS 1 4 1 62 48 11 12 0 6 3 16 0 1.6 965 1355 3.7
3 S&M 1 1 0 23 12 3 2 1 4 0 2 0 1.0 638 1355 3.9
4 SEARCH 2 5 1 57 62 2 12 2 6 2 27 11 2.3 931 1355 4.1
5 2-MAX 1 1 0 23 12 2 4 0 4 2 0 0 2.3 583 1355 3.0
6 2-SORT 1 2 0 35 28 5 7 2 6 2 6 0 1.8 683 1355 3.2
7 DUTCH 1 4 1 72 75 13 22 4 21 0 15 0 2.6 1447 1355 4.1
8 LCP 2 2 0 40 28 4 7 0 6 2 9 0 1.0 1359 1355 4.2
9 ROT 1 3 3 51 74 14 10 3 17 2 28 0 2.6 1138 1355 4.1
10 SORT 1 9 6 177 219 31 38 9 56 5 80 0 2.6 2302 1355 5.8
11 ITER 3 8 0 88 69 15 26 6 0 0 11 11 1.4 1461 1355 8.9
12 S/O 3 6 0 71 56 10 14 4 3 0 15 10 1.4 1156 1355 4.4
13 CMP 2 5 3 54 125 19 18 5 0 2 72 9 4.3 1327 1355 7.5
14 MC 3 7 0 63 61 9 14 5 0 0 26 7 1.8 956 579 3.7
15 MAR 2 5 0 45 50 12 11 3 0 0 19 5 2.3 755 579 3.3
16 DLL 2 8 0 69 76 12 14 4 0 0 39 7 2.0 891 579 4.4
17 PIP 2 5 1 54 111 23 18 6 0 1 56 7 3.9 988 1355 5.8
18 CLOSE 9 18 0 145 106 40 31 8 0 0 22 5 0.8 2418 688 5.7
19 STRAT 4 4 0 43 5 0 4 0 0 0 1 0 0.2 868 579 3.3
20 CMD 6 8 0 77 32 4 14 2 0 0 10 5 0.7 1334 579 3.3
21 MAP 1 8 0 78 67 6 29 2 6 4 15 5 2.3 1259 1355 4.1
22 QUEUE 4 13 1 121 101 11 26 1 0 0 48 15 1.5 2360 1355 7.4
23 TMAX 1 3 0 31 43 3 12 2 0 2 19 5 2.1 460 1355 3.2
24 BUFF 1 9 0 66 54 8 19 4 0 0 12 11 1.1 1256 1355 4.4
25 HSET 5 14 5 146 341 45 39 10 20 2 197 28 3.7 3546 1355 13.7
26 GAME1 4 8 0 165 93 16 13 4 31 3 10 16 1.2 4044 1355 26.6
27 GAME2 8 18 0 307 173 25 27 11 48 3 29 30 1.4 7037 1355 54.2
total 72 184 22 2262 2165 354 455 98 246 44 784 184 1.9 43089 1355 203.8
Table 2: Verification of benchmark problems with AutoProof.
tion of object-oriented programs. To our knowledge, no other auto-active verifier fully
supports the complex reasoning about class invariants that is crucial to verify object-
oriented pattern implementation such as S/O and PIP. It is important to remark that we’re
describing practical capabilities of tools: other auto-active verifiers may support logics
sufficiently rich to express the semantics of object-oriented benchmarks, but this is a far
cry from automated verification that is approachable idiomatically at the level of a real
object-oriented language. Also, AutoProof’s performance is incomparable against that
of interactive tools, which may still offer some automation but always have the option
of falling back to asking users when verification gets stuck.
The flip side of AutoProof’s focus on supporting a real object-oriented language
is that it may not be the most powerful tool to verify purely algorithmic problems.
The benchmarks have shown that AutoProof still works quite well in that domain, and
there are no intrinsic limitations that prevent from applying it to the most complex
examples. However, algorithmic verification is often best approached at a level that
abstracts from implementation details (such as pointers and objects) and can freely
use high-level constructs such as infinite maps and nondeterminism. Verifiers such as
Dafny [22] and Why3 [11], whose input languages have been explicitly designed to
match such abstraction level, are thus best suited for algorithmic verification, which is
instead not the primary focus of AutoProof.
Another aspect of the complexity vs. expressivity trade-off emerges when verifying
realistic data structure implementations (or, more generally, object-oriented code as it is
written in real-life projects). Tools such as Dafny offer a bare-bones framing methodol-
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ogy that is simple to learn (and to teach) and potentially very expressive; but it becomes
unwieldy to reason about complicated implementations, which require to deal with an
abundance of special cases by specifying each of them at a low level of detail—and
annotational complexity easily leads to unfeasible verification. AutoProof’s methodol-
ogy is richer, which implies a steeper learning curve but also a variety of constructs
and defaults that can significantly reduce the annotational overhead and whose custom
Boogie translation offers competitive performance in many practical cases.
Given AutoProof’s goal of targeting a real programming language, there are few
domain-specific features of the Eiffel language that are not fully supported but are used
in practice in a variety of programs: reasoning in AutoProof about strings and floating-
point numbers is limited by the imprecision of the verification models of such features.
For instance (see Sect. 3.2), floating point numbers are translated as infinite-precision
reals; precise reasoning requires manually specifying properties of floating point op-
erations. Another domain deliberately excluded from AutoProof so far is concurrent
programming. As a long term plan, we envision extending AutoProof to cover these
domains to the extent possible: precise functional verification of such features is still
largely an open challenge for automated verification tools.
A related goal of AutoProof’s research is verifying a fully-specified realistic data
structure library—the first such verification carried out entirely with an auto-active tool.
This effort—one of the original driving forces behind designing AutoProof’s features—
has been recently completed with the verification of the EiffelBase2 container library [9].
6 Discussion
How do AutoProof’s techniques and implementation generalize to other domains? While
Eiffel has its own peculiarities, it is clear that AutoProof’s techniques are applicable
with little changes to other mainstream object-oriented languages such as Java and
C#; and that AutoProof’s architecture uses patterns that lead to proper designs in other
object-oriented languages too.
A practically important issue is the input language, namely how to reconcile the
conflicting requirements of supporting Eiffel as completely as possible and of having
a convenient notation for expressing annotations necessary for auto-active verification.
While Eiffel natively supports fundamental specification elements (pre- and postcondi-
tions and invariants), we had to introduce ad hoc notations, using naming conventions
and dummy features, to express modifies clauses, ghost code, and other verification-
specific directives in a way that is backward compatible with Eiffel syntax. We con-
sidered different implementation strategies, such as using a pre-processor or extending
Eiffel’s parser, but we concluded that being able to reuse standard Eiffel tools without
modifying them is a better option in terms of reusability and compatibility (as the lan-
guage and its tools may evolve), albeit it sacrifices a bit of notational simplicity. This
trade-off is reasonable whenever the goal is verifying programs in a real language used
in practice; verifiers focused on algorithmic challenges would normally prefer ad hoc
notations with an abstraction level germane to the tackled problems.
In future work, AutoProof’s architecture could integrate translations to back-end
verifiers other than Boogie. To this end, we could leverage verification systems such as
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Why3 [11], which generates verification conditions and discharges them using a variety
of SMT solvers or other provers.
Supporting back-ends with different characteristics is one of the many aspects that
affect the flexibility of AutoProof and similar tools. Another crucial aspect is the quality
of feedback in case of failed verification attempts, when users have to change the in-
put to fix errors and inconsistencies, work around limitations of the back-end, or both.
As mentioned in Sect. 3, AutoProof incorporates heuristics that improve feedback. An-
other component of the EVE environment combines AutoProof with automatic random
testing and integrates the results of applying both [33]. As future work we plan to fur-
ther experiment with integrating the feedback of diverse code analysis tools (AutoProof
being one of them) to improve usability of verification.
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